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Primary bleed and feedThe severe accidents at Fukushima have shown that a further development of Severe Accident
Management Guidelines (SAMGs) is necessary. Within this work, the severe accident code ASTEC V2.0
is used to assess the impact of selected SAM measures on the in-vessel progression of Small Break
(SBLOCA) scenarios in a generic German Konvoi PWR.
The progression of reference SBLOCA sequences with and without Station Blackout (SBO) is firstly ana-
lyzed. Calculations show that melting and vessel failure can be delayed if the secondary side is filled
before the plant is struck by the SBO. Based on these results, a systematic evaluation of primary side
depressurization and core reflooding as primary SAM measures is carried out. Simulations yield the
following results:
• Primary Side Depressurization must be initiated before the Core Exit Temperature (CET) > 400 C or, if
not possible, with a maximum delay of 20 min to delay core melting and vessel failure.
• Core reflooding must be launched immediately after CET > 650 C with at least 7.50–20 kg/s in order
to mitigate the accident without major core damage.
• If an external injection is used for such aim, the deployment order of a medium-high pressure head
(>20 bars) mobile pump must be issued 1 h after the entrance in SBO.
• Vessel failure cannot be prevented if more than 20 corium tons are present in the lower plenum for
more than 1 h regardless of the injection rate.
The performed investigations clarify ASTEC V2.0 capabilities to describe the in-vessel progression of a sev-
ere accident in PWRs and contribute to extend the technical basis for the further improvement of SAMGs
in German Konvoi PWR.
 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Beyond design basis accidents in nuclear power plants (NPPs)
are a major concern due to the hazardous consequences that they
may inflict. In order to control those, NPPs envisage the existenceof Accident Management (AM) programs, which aim at preventing
and mitigating core damage, maintaining containment integrity
and minimizing off-site releases (IAEA, 2004). The AM measures
aiming at the first goal are tagged as preventive, whereas those
pointing at the latter three are tagged as mitigative and often
referred to as Severe Accident Management (SAM) measures.
The last decades have seen a worldwide improvement of
SAM measures (EPRI, 2012, 1993; European Commission,
2000), especially after the severe accident occurred at the Unit
2 of Three-Miles-Island (Broughton et al., 1989). In turn, this
progress has allowed the creation of plant-specific Severe Acci-
dent Management Guidelines (SAMGs) in accordance to the
requirements of the national regulatory bodies, generally in
compliance with the IAEA (2009, 2004) and WENRA (2014,
2007) safety standards.
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NPP have revealed that a further enhancement of SAM measures is
necessary (NEA-OECD, 2013). As a result, significant changes to
plant coping capabilities have been made to water cooled NPPs
worldwide (Hermsmeyer et al., 2014; Lutz and Prior, 2016). In Ger-
many, these changes have been included in an Action Plan for the
implementation of measures after Fukushima (BMUB, 2016, 2014
,2012), elaborated by the Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) upon
request from the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMUB). These recommendations
have concerned, for example, the implementation of plant specific
SAMGs, recently fulfilled (Braun et al., 2014), and the optimization
of accident measures and the review of injection possibilities
under Station Blackout conditions.
For the elaboration of SAMGs, a broad number of deterministic
analyses considering the risk-relevant sequences of the NPP under
consideration must be produced using validated severe accident
simulations tools, which are at the state-of-the-art in terms of
modelling (Bunt et al., 2015; Klein-Hebling et al., 2014). Hence,
the validation and improvement of severe accident codes is pur-
sued worldwide through dedicated research programs (European
Commission, 2017; Jacquemain et al., 2015; Miassoedov et al.,
2015; Van Dorsselaere et al., 2015).
The European severe accident ASTEC code, jointly developed by
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) and
Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), can simulate
complete severe accident sequences (Chatelard et al., 2014). Fur-
thermore, within the EU CESAM project (GRS, 2017), ASTEC capa-
bilities are being improved (new modelling features, extended
validation, enhancement of numerics) in order to support the
choice of SAM strategies for different types of water cooled NPPs
(Chatelard et al., 2016).
Within this work, the ASTEC V2.0 (rev3) version is applied to
assess the impact of selected SAM measures (e.g. primary side
depressurization, core reflooding) on the in-vessel progression of
selected SBLOCA sequences in a generic German Konvoi PWR, con-
tinuing the work initiated in (Gómez-García-Toraño et al., 2017).
SBLOCAs in the main coolant line have been selected due to its high
significance for the risk of core damage in such plants (GRS, 2002).
Analyses consider the aforementioned recommendations of the
RSK after the Fukushima accidents.
First of all, a brief description of the ASTEC V2.0 numerical tool
and about generic model of a Konvoi PWR (e.g. geometry, safety
systems and automatisms) is presented in Section 2. The Section 3
goes on to explain the evolution of the reference sequences with-
out operator actions. These consider the availability of all active
systems until the plant is struck by an SBO at an uncertain time
of the accident. Based on these reference sequences, the Section 4
investigates the impact of a delayed Primary Side Depressurization
and of a delayed water injection into the primary circuit by means
of hypothetical mobile pumps. Finally, Section 5 encompasses the
main conclusions of this work and offers an outlook for the contin-
uation of these investigations in the short and long term.2. Numerical tool and PWR plant model
2.1. The European reference code ASTEC
The integral severe accident code ASTEC V2.0 (Chatelard et al.,
2014) is the European reference tool for the analysis of severe acci-
dents in LWR. The code is able to simulate complete severe acci-
dent sequences. The main applications areas are source term
determination, Probability Safety Assessment and SAM studies.
The structure of ASTEC is modular, each of its modules considering
a particular domain of the reactor or a set of physical phenomena.For the description of the in-vessel SA-phenomena, the modules of
interest are the CESAR and ICARE modules. In ASTEC V2.0, CESAR
simulates the thermal-hydraulics of the primary and secondary
circuit, as well as in the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) up to the
beginning of core degradation. From this moment on, CESAR calcu-
lates the thermal hydraulics throughout the primary and sec-
ondary circuit, whereas ICARE overtakes the thermal-hydraulics
within the vessel as soon as the core is uncovered. Both modules
solve the thermal-hydraulics in one dimension by making use of
five-equation approach.
2.2. Generic PWR Konvoi plant model with ASTEC V2.0
The reference plant is the four loop German Konvoi PWR
(Ludwig, 2007; Siemens, 1991; Ziegler and Allelein, 2013). The
ASTEC V2.0 model of a generic German Konvoi PWR used in the
current work has been derived from a more detailed one used by
GRS in previous studies (Nowack et al., 2011; Reinke et al.,
2013). The geometry of the reactor domains, the physical phenom-
ena considered during the in-vessel phase and the most relevant
safety systems are identical to the ones described in (Gómez-Gar
cía-Toraño et al., 2017).
A simplified sketch of the primary and secondary circuits
(together with the relevant safety systems for this work) is
depicted in Fig. 1. The four loop PWR is represented by two loops:
the loop B (containing the pressurizer) and the loop A (containing
the other three loops). The RPV is radially divided in eight chan-
nels: the downcomer (connected to the cold leg collector), the
bypass and the six core channels (connected to the upper plenum).
The bottom of the active core height corresponds to the elevation
z = 0 m; the top corresponds to the elevation z = 3.90 m; the bot-
tom of the lower head corresponds to the elevation z = 3 m.
The pressurizer is equipped with a Pilot Operated Relief Valve
(PORV), which discharges into the pressurizer relief tank for sys-
tem pressures above 166 bar, and with two Safety Valves (SV1
and SV2), discharging into the same tank for system pressures
above 170 bar and 176 bar. All valves can be opened upon request
if DC power is available.
In addition to the representation of the primary and secondary
circuits, the following automatic actions and safety systems are
also included in the ASTEC plant model:
 SCRAM initiated by the Reactor Control Protection System
(RCPS) when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure falls
below 132 bar or when the containment overpressure exceeds
30 mbar.
 Following SCRAM, the RCPS closes the steam admission to the
turbine and shuts down the main feedwater pumps into the
Steam Generators (SG). If the two conditions are fulfilled, the
reactor is cooled down at a rate of 100 K/h through the SGs.
 The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is activated when
two of the following three conditions are fulfilled: containment
overpressure above 30 mbar, RCS pressure below 110 bar or
pressurizer liquid level below 2.30 m.
 Following the ECCS criterion, the Main Coolant Pump (MCPs)
are coasted down and the pressure regulation in the pressurizer
is switched off.
The Emergency Feedwater System (EFWS) is activated when the
liquid level of one SG falls below 4.50 m (relative to the bottom of
the riser region), and regulates liquid level in the riser region to
keep covered the U-tubes. The Extra Borating System is activated
when the pressurizer water level falls below 2.30 m (relative to
the bottom of the pressurizer), and injects 8 kg/s (2 kg/s per train)
in the cold legs of the RCS. The water is aspired from specific
borated tanks with a capacity of 18 m3.
Fig. 1. Sketch of the Primary and Secondary circuit modelling for a generic German Konvoi PWR by ASTEC V2.0 (Gómez-García-Toraño et al., 2017).
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active High and Low Pressure Injections Systems (HPIS and LPIS).
The ACCUs discharge at an initial pressure of 25 bar into the hot
and cold legs of the RCS. Each train of the HPIS injects up to
75 kg/s below 110 bar, whereas each train of the LPIS injects up
to 150 kg/s below 12 bar. Each train of the HPIS and the LPIS takes
water from a different borated water tank (with a capacity of
480 m3) and injects it into the cold leg collector. Trains injecting
into the same loop take water from the same tank. The existence
of mobile pumps injecting into the cold leg collector of the RCS
has been assumed. The name of the mobile pumps, their pressure
head and their nominal flow rate are encompassed in Table 1.3. Analysis of SBLOCA-sequences without SAM
The reference SBLOCA sequence paper postulates a 10 cm2
break in the cold leg of the pressurizer loop (see Fig. 1) at 0.0 h.
The following assumptions are made:Table 1
Main features of the mobile equipment injecting into the primary circuit.
Name Head (bar) Flow rate (kg/s)
M651h 50 22
M100h 45 41
XH100 18 80
HH125 10 45
AE18G 7 130 Failure of the automatic 100 K/h cooldown procedure through
the SGs.
 Availability of 3 out of 4 trains of the HPIS and the LPIS. The
fourth is assumed to be under maintenance.
 Failure of sump recirculation mode.
 No Accident Management measures.
In a first step, Section 3.1 studies the behaviour of the reactor
considering that there is an unlimited AC power supply. Then, Sec-
tion 3.2 postulates that the plant enters in Station Blackout at a dif-
ferent times after SCRAM.3.1. Reference SBLOCA sequence with unlimited AC power
The SBLOCA sequence analysed in this section, identified as
(SBLOCA-) Ref, assumes the availability of AC power supply during
the whole transient. Hence, it involves all safety systems enumer-
ated in Section 2.2, except the ones introduced in Section 3. For
better understanding, Fig. 2 provides the reader with a sketch of
one primary and secondary loop at the time of the initiating event
as well as the safety systems assumed to work during the accident.
The evolution of pressures, void fractions, temperatures, heat
transfer rates at relevant plant locations and the mass flow rates
injected by key safety systems and exiting the circuit through
the break can be found in Figs. 3–4. The coloured vertical lines
mark occurrence times of major events in the simulation. The sum-
mary of events occurring in the simulation relative to the break
opening is shown in Table 2.
Fig. 2. Sketch of the primary loop containing the pressurizer and its associated
secondary loop, together with the plant safety systems involved in Ref-SBLOCA.
Breach located in the cold leg of pressurizer loop, just before the entrance to the
cold leg collector.
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increases by 30 mbar, leading to SCRAM. Then, the RCPS issues
the signal of turbine trip, triggering the set of automatic actions
described in Section 2.2. Meanwhile, the pressurizer reaches satu-
ration and its liquid level decreases below 2.28 m, leading to the
fulfillment of ECCS criteria and other related actions (see
Section 2.2).
The performance of the HPIS is limited (50–70 kg/s) during the
first minutes, because the RCS pressure is still high (100 bar), and
does not manage to replace the loss of inventory through the break
(Fig. 3-b). Consequently, the pressure continues falling down to
75 bar. From that point in time (and up to the depletion of the
borated water tanks at about 4 h), the HPIS is able to compensate
the loss of water inventory through the break (110 kg/s) and hence,
the pressure of the RCS is constant.
Afterwards, the RCS continues losing inventory through the
break and the pressure falls below 25 bar, leading to the discharge
of ACCUs into the RCS (Fig. 3-a). After the depletion of the ACCUs,
the residual power exceeds the power transmitted through to the
SGs plus the one released through the break (Fig. 3-c). As a result,
temperatures and pressures build up in the RCS, hindering steam
condensation in the primary side of the U-tubes.
The lower mass flow rate through the loop A than through the
loop B leads to an earlier dry-out of the SGA primary side (at about
6.50 h) compared to SGB (at about 7.50 h). After dry-out, the void
fraction in the cold leg entrance of the corresponding loop jumps
to 0.25 and remains constant in this value, because the steam com-
ing from the core is blocking the water flow through the break.
Later on, at 8.50 h, the cold legs reach saturation, leading first to
a sudden increase of the void fraction (Fig. 4-b-c). Despite the
renewed condensation in the SGs due to the generated steam
(Fig. 4-b), it is not sufficient to compensate the loss of inventory
and hence, core uncovery occurs shortly afterwards.
As a result, core temperatures increase first due to the decay
heat and then, at about 9.50 h, due to the oxidation of the Zircaloycladdings. In the absence of AMmeasures, the SA continues its pro-
gression with the detection of a CET above 650 C, the release of U-
Zr-O mixtures to the core region, their relocation to the lower ple-
num in different steps (few tons at 10 h after SCRAM; 20 additional
tons of corium in the following 30 min) and the eventual failure of
the RPV at about 11.50 h.
The predicted evolution of the accident is consistent with the
results obtained for a similar SBLOCA sequence by GRS using MEL-
COR (Sonnenkalb, 2001). In ASTEC simulations the intervention of
the EFWS and the availability of 3 out of 4 HPIS trains are consid-
ered, while in the MELCOR simulations they are not. Despite these
different hypotheses, a qualitative comparison can be made.
Although the HPIS stops earlier the injection in ASTEC, the cooling
effect of the EFWS on the primary circuit is able to delay core melt-
ing with respect to the MELCOR calculation. Therefore, vessel fail-
ure occurs later (at about 11.50 h) than in the referred work (at
about 9.75 h). Further details about this comparison can be found
in (Gómez-García-Toraño, 2017).3.2. Reference SBLOCA sequence with SBO at different times
The previous section has shown that the postulated SBLOCA
with unlimited AC power leads to RPV failure in a time window
of 12 h. Within this chapter, it is assumed that the plant experi-
ences a SBO at 1 h or 6 h after SCRAM during Ref-SBLOCA. The
sequences are identified with AC1h and AC6h, which involve all
the plant active safety systems (see Section 2.2) up to the of AC
power supply. For better readability, Fig. 5 shows a sketch of the
primary loop containing the pressurizer and the associated sec-
ondary loop together with the safety systems involved after the
SBO i.e. accumulators.
The computed evolution of the system pressure, the core liquid
level (relative to the bottom of the core active height) and the SGB
liquid level (relative to the bottom of the riser) is shown in Fig. 6.
For AC1h, the EFWS does not manage to inject water into the
SGs, since the set point is not reached (see Section 2.2). As a result,
the secondary side of the SGs is not able to cool down the primary
side, which is maintained at high pressures until the reactor is
much voided. For this case, the accident progresses quickly, leading
to RPV failure at high pressures. Conversely, the accident is slowed
down if SBO occurs after the refilling of one SG e.g. AC6h. In such
case, as soon as the injection of EFWS is stopped, the heat transfer
from the primary to the secondary circuit is deteriorated. There-
fore, there is a lower condensation in the primary side of the SGs
and hence, a faster increase of the RCS pressure than in the refer-
ence case. All things considered, an additional grace time of up to
6 h for AM measures may be achieved if the secondary side of
the SGs is completely refilled in case the plant meets a situation
of SBO.4. Analysis of SBLOCA-sequences with SAM
The previous chapter has shown that, if no AM is considered,
the selected SBLOCA sequences lead to RPV failure at medium pres-
sures. The aim now is to put in place SAMmeasures in order to pre-
vent or, if not possible, to mitigate the accident. Considering an
intact containment, the SAM procedures of a German Konvoi
PWR foresee a Primary Side Depressurization (PSD) as a first
SAM measure (Braun et al., 2014). After the reactor is depressur-
ized, the most imperative SAM measure is core reflooding. Within
this section, the following roadmap has been followed:
Firstly, the impact of a delayed PSD on the severe accident pro-
gression is investigated both for a late and early SBO in Section 4.1.
The delay is relative to the fulfilment of the PBF criterion i.e. detec-
tion of a CET = 400 C. Afterwards, the Section 4.2 investigates the
Fig. 3. Evolution of pressures, mass flow rates (given by relevant safety systems or exiting through the break) and relevant heat transfer rates during Ref-SBLOCA as a function
of the time after SCRAM. Major events of the simulation are represented by dashed vertical line.
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CET = 400 C by means of all pressurizer valves. Therein, a com-
bined analysis of the reflooding delay (relative to PSD onset i.e.
CET 400 C), the used mobile pump and the SBO time is investi-
gated. A flow chart summarizing all performed SBLOCA calcula-
tions is shown in Fig. 7.4.1. Primary side depressurization and passive core reflooding
Within this section, the sequences AC1h and AC6h have been
considered. In a Konvoi PWR, PSD is generally executed as soon
as the CET exceeds 400 C or when the core liquid level falls below
min3 (Roth-Seefrid et al., 1994). However, this work considers that
the measurement of the liquid level is not available, which impliesthat the earliest initiation of PSD is the detection of CET 400 C.
Besides, it is considered that PSD may be delayed 0–80 min with
respect to such detection due to harsh environmental conditions
experienced by the plant crew.4.1.1. Loss of AC power at 6 h
Firstly of all, the impact of a delayed PSD on the sequence AC6h
is investigated. For that aim, the grace times gained due to PSD
(with respect to the sequence AC6h) are represented in Fig. 8 as a
function of the PSD delay (relative to the detection of CET
400 C). The graph contains several black dashed vertical lines,
which are the occurrence times of main events of the sequence
without any PSD i.e. AC6h.
Fig. 4. Evolution of relative liquid levels (at relevant plant locations), void fractions and temperatures (at selected locations of the RCS) during Ref-SBLOCA as a function of the
time after SCRAM. Major events of the simulation are represented by dashed vertical lines.
Table 2
Summary of events during the sequence Ref-SBLOCA (SBLOCA with unlimited AC
power supply) relative to the break opening.
Time (h) Name of Event
0.00 Break opening
0.01 SCRAM (Containment overpressure of 30 mbar)
 Feed water loop A/B closed
 Admission turbine A/B closed
0.03 ECCS signal (Pressurizer level below 2.30 m):
 Activation Extra Borating System
 Coast-down MCP loop A, B
 Failure of 100 K/h cooldown through SGs
 Stop pressurizer regulations (heaters and sprays)
 Activation trains HPI_A1, HPI_A2, HPI_A3
2.26 Deactivation Extra Borating System (tanks empty)
2.51 EFWS injecting into SGB (Liquid level SGB <4.5 m)
4.18 Deactivation of HPI_A1/2/3 (tanks empty):
 Failure of sump recirculation mode
4.20 Accumulator discharge into cold/hot legs
9.20 Detection of CET 400 C
9.62 Detection of CET 650 C
9.67 First cladding dissolution by molten Zircaloy
9.98 First material slump into the lower plenum
10.30 20 corium tons in the lower plenum
11.50 Lower head vessel failure
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ried out aiming at delaying the progression of AC6h. At the moment
of PSD initiation, the core has already started melting (indicated by
the last vertical line). In addition, the action would anticipate the
corium relocation to the lower plenum (0.20 h), delay a 20-ton-
corium relocation to the lower plenum (+3 h) and delay RPV failure
(+3.7 h) with respect to AC6h.
Additionally, Fig. 9 illustrates the influence of a delayed PSD on
the RCS pressure and the temperature of the metallic layer in the
lower plenum (LP) as a function of the time after the detection of
CET 400 C. Therein, red crosses mark PSD initiation (for the
sequences with PSD) and black points mark the occurrence of
RPV failure.
Results show that PSD does not delay significantly core melting
nor the corium relocation to the lower plenum, but it extends at
least 1.30 h the time to RPV failure if performed within the first
40 min after detecting CET 400 C (see Fig. 8). In fact, a 40-min
delayed PSD provides the longest grace times to prevent the relo-
cation of 20 corium tons to the lower plenum (+3 h) and RPV fail-
ure (+3.7 h).
This behaviour occurs because the accumulators manage to cool
down the metallic layer in the lower plenum (Fig. 9). As a result,
the heat transfer from the metallic layer to the vessel wall
Fig. 5. Sketch of the primary loop containing the pressurizer and its associated
secondary loop, together with the plant safety systems involved in AC1h-AC6h. No
active systems work after loss of AC power supply.
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until the accumulators become empty and additional tons of cor-
ium tons relocate to the LP, which leads to the heat up of the
metallic layer until vessel failure. It should be stated that the valid-
ity of the last finding is limited, since the reality shows that the
corium may still relocate to the LP even if the molten pool is sur-
rounded by water (Broughton et al., 1989; Seiler and Tourniaire,
2014).
4.1.2. Influence of the SBO time
The attention is now focused on the effect of SBO time on PSD
performance. For that aim, another set of calculations with differ-
ent PSD delays has been simulated based on AC1h. The grace times
gained due to PSD are illustrated in Fig. 10 as a function of the
delay since the conditions for PSD were fulfilled. The comparison
between Figs. 8 and 10 yields the following results:
 The grace times to avoid core melting, relocation to LP and RPV
failure are extended if PSD is initiated at CET 400 C. However,
the extension is more significant in AC1hPSDCET400C (1.7 h,
1.8 h, 3.7 h) than in AC6hPSDCET400C (0.2 h, 0.4 h, 1.3 h). This is
motivated by the higher mass flow rate injected by the ACCUs
in the first case (see higher core liquid level in Fig. 11), which
is related to their higher discharge pressure upon PSD initiation
(25 bar vs 12 bar). In turn, this happens because the ACCUs
were already involved in previous stages of the accident in
AC6 h (Fig. 3-a-b). Grace times are also extended for PSDs with
20 min delay, but less significantly than for the sequences with-
out delay.
 The maximum PSD delay in order to significantly postpone the
time of RPV failure is 40 min since the detection of CET 400 C.
In fact, although corium relocation in the LP has already
occurred in this case, PSD manages to extend about 4.5 h(AC1hPSD40 min vs AC1h) and 3.70 h (AC1hPSD40 min vs AC6h) the
time to RPV failure. Reasons behind this delay were explained
in Section 4.1.1.
 PSD does not delay RPV failure if it is initiated 1 h after the
detection of CET 400 C, because more than 20 tons have been
heating up the lower head wall for at least 20 min. However,
it brings the benefit of avoiding RPV failure at high pressures.
Summing up, the performance of PSD without delay allows an
extension of the grace time to prevent core melting and RPV fail-
ure. The delays are higher for AC1h than for AC6h due to the higher
inventory of the ACCUs. However, the global grace time to prevent
RPV failure is still higher in AC6hPSD400C (5.90 h + 6.00 h = 11.90 h
vs. 10.60 h of AC6h) than in AC1hPSD400C (7.25 h + 1.00 h = 8.25 h
vs 4.60 h of AC1h).
4.1.3. Comparison with other studies and discussion
The calculations presented above suggest the existence of a
time window within which the action significantly delays core
melting and RPV failure. In particular, PSD should be initiated at
the stipulated time (i.e. when CET exceeds 400 C), or, if not possi-
ble, during the following 20 min after such detection. This value is
congruent with that contained in the SAMGs of the Konvoi PWR for
very small breaks (Braun et al., 2014; Loeffler et al., 2012). In addi-
tion, the previous calculations have predicted that the longest time
window to RPV failure takes place for a 40-min delayed PSD. How-
ever, it is difficult to extrapolate this finding to the reactor, because
the plant crew will not be likely to wait for 40 min under such
stressful conditions, but to immediately execute it to provide
coolability and prevent RPV failure at medium-high pressures.
4.2. Primary side depressurization and active core reflooding
Once the RCS has been depressurized through a PSD, the subse-
quent SAM measure is the injection of water into the RCS. The cur-
rent section investigates the impact of core reflooding on the
sequences AC1hPSDCET400 and AC6hPSDCET400 (which assume a suc-
cessful PSD at CET 400 C). For both sequences, injection occurs
at different times by means of the mobile pumps (see flow chart
in Fig. 7). Calculations are terminated when one of the following
three conditions is fulfilled: core liquid level higher than min3
(15 cm above core active head), final time of the simulation
reached (i.e. 10 h after reflooding onset) and RPV failure.
A detailed analysis on reflooding is performed in the first place
for the sequence AC6hPSDCET400. Afterwards, the influence of an
early loss of AC power supply (AC1hPSDCET400) is compared to a late
one in terms of core reflooding success.
4.2.1. Loss of AC power at 6 h and PSD at CET 400 C
The study is divided in three parts: individual influence of
mobile equipment (fixed pump), individual influence of reflooding
time (fixed injection time) and combined influence of reflooding
time and mobile equipment.
4.2.1.1. Influence of mobile equipment. At first, the influence of dif-
ferent mobile equipment on the core liquid level and the corium
mass in the core during a 40-min-delayed reflooding (relative to
PSD initiation i.e. CET 400 C) is studied. The evolution of such vari-
ables is depicted in Fig. 12 as a function of the time after PSD ini-
tiation, together with the case without active core reflooding
(AC6hPSDCET400). The red line marks reflooding initiation (for the
cases involving reflooding) whereas black points at the end of
curves mark the occurrence of RPV failure.
The equipment AE18G does not manage to inject water into the
reactor, because its pressure head is always lower than the pres-
sure in the RCS. Consequently, core uncovery evolves similarly to
Fig. 6. Evolution of the RCS pressure, the core and the SGB liquid level (relative to the bottom of the active core and to the bottom of the riser region in SGB respectively)
during SBLOCA sequences without (Ref) and with SBO (AC1h and AC6h) as a function of the time after SCRAM.
Fig. 7. Flow chart of performed SBLOCA calculations (1st level: time of AC power loss; 2nd level: delay in PSD initiation after CET 400 C detection; 3rd level: delay in core
reflooding after PSD initiation, initiated at CET 400 C; 4th level: mobile pump used for core reflooding).
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Fig. 8. Grace times gained due to PSD in comparison to the AC6h (SBLOCA with SBO
6 h after SCRAM without PSD) as a function of the delay after the detection of
CET = 400 C. Black dashed vertical lines mark occurrence times of major events in
AC6h.
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tional venting paths opened in the RCS. A slight increase of the
pump pressure head (e.g. HH125) results in a higher efficiency,
but still low, because the RCS pressure oscillates around the pres-
sure head of the pump. Therefore, the quench front progression is
slow. Nevertheless, this is not translated into the further release of
corium into the core. The influence of repressurization on the
Reflooding Mass Flow Rate (RMFR) is overcome with increasing
pressure heads and high mass flow rates (e.g. M651h), which allow
a quick core refilling.
4.2.1.2. Influence of injection time. Turning now to the injection
time, several delays on the deployment of the mobile pump
M651h (see features in Table 1) have been simulated. The influence
of this delay on the core liquid level and the corium mass in the
core is shown in Fig. 13 as a function of the time after PSD initia-
tion, together with the sequence without active refloodingFig. 9. Influence of a delayed (after CET = 400 C) PSD on the evolution of the RCS pressu
AC6h (SBLOCA with SBO at 6 h after SCRAM without PSD). Red crosses mark PSD initiatio
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)(AC6hPSDCET400C). In both graphs, red crosses indicate reflooding ini-
tiation (for the cases involving reflooding) whereas black points at
the end of certain curves indicate RPV failure.
The calculations yield the following results:
A 40-min-delayed reflooding produces a temperature excur-
sion, which leads to the release of several corium tons into the core
region, but it can terminate the accident without major core dam-
age. On the other hand, a 3-h-delayed injection can neither prevent
nor delay vessel failure. This happens because at least 40 corium
tons relocate from the core region to the lower plenum at about
1.80 h (see decline of the corium mass in core in Fig. 13) and
heat-up the RPV wall for almost 1 h, leading ultimately to RPV fail-
ure. In between, intermediate behaviours can be seen: a 2-h
delayed reflooding already meets 30 corium tons in the core and
50 corium tons in the LP. In that case, core reflooding does not
cause further degradation, but a bundle cool down. Regardless of
the injection time, the generated pressure peaks do not affect the
pump performance due to its high pressure head (50 bars).
Therefore, it can be concluded that core reflooding has to be ini-
tiated as early as possible in order to terminate the accident with-
out any major damage. If that is not possible, reflooding encounters
a severely degraded core, and may not prevent nor avoid RPV
failure.4.2.1.3. Influence of RMFR and injection time on selected Figures of
Merit (FOM). After studying the individual impact of the injection
time and the mobile equipment on the progression of
AC6hPSDCET400C, this section addresses their combined influence on
the final Core Damage State (Fig. 14-a), mass of corium in the core
and in the LP (Fig. 14-b-c), relative time to RPV failure since PSD
initiation (Fig. 14-d), mass of water injected into the reactor
(Fig. 14-e) and refilling time (Fig. 14-f). The graphs can be read
using the same methodology as the one detailed in (Gómez-Garcí
a-Toraño et al., 2017), but they differ in two aspects: first, the
abscissa represents the delay in core reflooding with respect to
PSD initiation; second, the vertical lines represent the occurrence
times of major events in the sequence without any active core
reflooding i.e. AC6hPSDCET400.
The following key points can be extracted if the analysis is
restricted to the injection time and the RMFR without entering in
details of the system pressure:re and the temperature of the metallic layer in the lower plenum in comparison to
n and black points RPV failure. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
Fig. 10. Grace times gained due to PSD in comparison to the AC1h (SBLOCA with
SBO 1 h after SCRAM without PSD) as a function of the delay after the detection of
CET = 400 C. Black dashed vertical lines mark occurrence times of major events in
AC1h.
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delays of 40 min) are able to refill the core in about 30 min–
1 h with localized burst of some claddings if RMFRs are higher
than 40 kg/s (Fig. 14-a-e). This demands the provision of less
than 20 water tons (Fig. 14-f). If this is not possible, the release
of U-Zr-O mixtures into the core region are limited to 20 corium
tons if RMFRs are higher than 7.75 kg/s. However, for such
cases, the refilling time is at least 30 min and the required water
mass ranges from 50 to 300 tons (Fig. 14-a-e-f).
 Injections performed 1 h after the relocation of 20 tons of cor-
ium into the LP can neither prevent nor delay the failure of
the RPV (Fig. 14-a-d). This is motivated by the fact that a large
amount of corium (50 tons according to the decrease of corium
mass in the core region in Fig. 13) has been heating up the top
metallic layer (and hence, the RPV wall in contact with it), that
water injection into the reactor cannot invert this tendency.
Concerning the rest of injections with a RMFR above 10 kg/s, it
can be observed that the retention of a large amount of corium is
predicted either in the core region or in the lower plenum
(Fig. 14-b-c). However, these simulations entail uncertainty dueFig. 11. Evolution of the core liquid level during the sequences SBLOCA-AC1hPSDCET400 and
crosses mark PSD initiation; black points mark RPV failure occurrences. (For interpretati
version of this article.)to ASTEC V2.0 intrinsic limitations concerning degraded core
reflooding (Chatelard et al., 2014) and the external simulation cri-
teria (simulation finished when liquid level exceeds min3).
Up to this point, the combined influence of injection time and
average RMFR injected in the RCS has been explained. However,
the feedback of the system pressure on mobile system perfor-
mance remains to be discussed. This dependency influences the
ordinate of each point in the Fig. 14-a–f. This analysis is discussed
in the following:
 The efficiency of low pressure pumps (AE18G and HH125) is
very low even having initiated PSD at CET 400 C because any
water injection in the RCS yields a repressurization regardless
of the injection time. Therefore, the RCS pressure rises above
the pressure head of the equipment and the water supply is
stopped. For example, the pump AE18G delivers a RMFR close
to zero although its nominal RMFR is 130 kg/s (0% efficiency).
Similarly, the pump HH125 delivers 8 kg/s although it can
potentially deliver 45 kg/s (20% efficiency).
 High pressure pumps (M651h and M100h) are highly efficient
at any injection time even if the RCS becomes repressurized,
because the created pressure peaks are well below their pres-
sure head (45 and 50 bar).
 Medium pressure equipment such as the XH100 provide, as
anticipated, an intermediate performance. Although the RMFR
injected by the pumps is lower than the nominal, the repressur-
ization does not prevent the equipment from supplying a con-
siderable RMFR (50–75% efficiency).
In contrast to the high and low pressure pumps, the injection
time plays an important role for the medium pressure pumps,
especially when the core starts to heat-up (between 0.50 h and
1.00 h) and when a considerable amount of corium is released into
the core (between 1.50 h and 2.00 h). This happens because there is
a high steam production that causes enhanced core oxidation and
global temperature increase, which affects the pump performance.
Once a considerable quantity of corium has relocated into the LP,
the RMFR provided by such system becomes higher, since the
quench front progresses in the core region in the absence of active
material.4.2.2. Influence of the SBO time
The same procedure has been repeated for the sequence
AC1hPSDCET400C, the independent variables and the FOMs being iden-
tical to the previous calculations, as can be observed in Fig. 15. For
this case, the injection is restricted to times beyond 1.20 h afterSBLOCA-AC6hPSDCET400 (SBLOCA with SBO 1/6 h after SCRAM, PSD at CET 400 C). Red
on of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
Fig. 12. Influence of mobile equipment during a 40-min delayed (after PSD initiation) reflooding on the core liquid level and the coriummass in the core in comparison to the
sequence AC6hPSDCET400 (SBLOCA with SBO 6 h after SCRAM, with PSD at CET 400 C and without core reflooding). The red line marks the reflooding initiation and black points
mark RPV failure. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 13. Influence of a delayed (after PSD initiation) core reflooding by means of the equipment M651 h on the core liquid level and the coriummass in the core in comparison
to AC6hPSDCET400 (SBLOCA with SBO 6 h after SCRAM, with PSD at CET 400 C and without core reflooding). Red crosses mark the initiation of core reflooding and black points
RPV failure.
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tion 4.1.2). The influence of the SBO time can be derived by com-
paring these graphs with the ones shown in Fig. 14. The results
are compared to those obtained for AC6hPSDCET400C:
 Once the PSD is initiated, the grace time to prevent core melting
is higher in AC1hPSDCET400C than in AC6hPSDCET400C (2 h vs 20 min).
This occurs because the ACCUs inject enough water into the RCS
to completely cover the core in AC1hPSDCET400C, but not in
AC6hPSDCET400C, where they cannot push the core liquid
level above 2 m (half of the active length of the core) (see
Fig. 11). The minimum RMFR to mitigate the accident without major
damage is higher in AC1hPSDCET400C than in AC6hPSDCET400C
(20 kg/s vs.7.75 kg/s), because the residual power is higher at
CET 650 C (32 MW vs 28.5 MW). To put the times in an abso-
lute scale, a CET of 650 C was detected at a time of 1.0 h (since
PSD initiation) + 2.5 h (between loss of AC and PSD) + 1.0 h
(between SCRAM and loss of AC) 5 h since SCRAM in
AC1hPSDCET400C, in contrast to 8.8 h in AC6hPSDCET400C. The cooling
effect of the secondary also additionally contributes to the
reduction of the minimum RMFR in the case of AC6hPSDCET400C,
but it is very limited, since non-condensable gases start to be
produced above CET 650 C.
Fig. 14. Final value of selected FOMs as a function of the RMFR and the injection time relative to PSD initiation. Black dashed vertical lines represent occurrence times of
major events in AC6hPSDCET400 (SBLOCA with SBO at 6 h after SCRAM, with PSD at CET 400 C and without reflooding).
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Fig. 15. Final value of selected FOMs as a function of the RMFR and the injection time relative to PSD initiation. Black dashed vertical lines represent occurrence times of
major events in AC1hPSDCET400 (SBLOCA with SBO at 1 h after SCRAM, with PSD at CET 400 C and without reflooding).
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vent nor delay the RPV failure, because they cannot compensate
the ongoing loss of inventory. Likewise, injections performed
1 h after the relocation of 20 corium tons in the LP do not influ-
ence vessel failure regardless of the RMFR injected. Corium
retention from this moment on is predicted due to the external
simulation criteria (simulation terminated 10 h after reflooding
onset).
 The performance of the mobile equipment is comparable to that
explained for a late loss of AC power supply in the sense that
low and high pressure pumps have a poor/excellent perfor-
mance, and medium pressure equipment has an intermediate
one. However, differently to the previous chapter, the medium
pressure equipment has a better performance at any time
(60–80% nominal flow rate) than in AC6hPSDCET400C.
4.2.3. Comparison with other studies and discussion
The previous section has predicted the existence of a minimum
RMFR of about 7.75–20 kg/s to mitigate the accident without major
damage (less than 20 corium tons in core) if injection is performed
near the detection of CET 650 C. These values are in agreement
with the 300 gpm (20 kg/s) recommended for Westinghouse type
PWRs (NEI, 2006), and with the 5.80–12.50 kg/s predicted by
AREVA using MELCOR for German Konvoi PWRs (Braun et al.,
2014). The deviation comes from the fact that AREVA presents an
interpolated diagram with different regions, whereas this work
provides point data. Interpolating ASTEC values, the minimum
RMFR would be 4.50–13.50 kg/s, which is similar to the aforemen-
tioned study. Further details about this comparison can be found in
(Gómez-García-Toraño, 2017).
If mobile systems were used to provide this flow rate, an inter-
esting conclusion can be drawn. First of all, the tanks containing
the water should have a capacity of about 50–100 m3. Then, con-
sidering that PSD is performed at CET 400 C, Table 2 and Fig. 8 pro-
vide the existence of the following time windows relative to the
loss of AC:
 About 2 h up to CET 400 C i.e. initiation of primary bleed and
passive feed.
 About 3 h up to CET 650 C i.e. close to core melting.
 About 4 h up to corium relocation to the lower plenum.
 About 5 h to RPV failure.
Practical exercises in an American three-loop Westinghouse
PWR have estimated that the time window between the mobile
pump deployment order and the injection into the RCS is about
2 h (USNRC, 2012). Extrapolating a similar measure for the Konvoi
PWR, this means that the deployment order of a high pressure
pump should be issued with a maximum delay of 1 h after the
entrance in SBO so that the pump can inject before the CET
exceeds 650 C.
Although the injection by means of mobile equipment was dis-
cussed in Germany in the light of Fukushima (BMUB, 2012), such
measure has been recently ruled out (BMUB, 2016). Reasons
behind this decision lie in the hazard of a radionuclide release to
the environment if the connection to the primary is not success-
fully performed. In the absence of an external injection, the other
path to provide core coolability would be the restoration of key
plant safety systems by means of mobile DGs. Considering that
the operators succeeded in restoring the AC before the CET exceeds
650 C, it would be possible to derive the potential efficiency of the
retrieved core cooling systems. However, the influence of a poten-
tial RCS repressurization has to be considered.
The retrieval of one train of the HPIS (75 kg/s) or two trains of
the Control Volume Chemical System (24 kg/s) would immediately
cool down the bundle, since their efficiency is not affected by apotential repressurization of the reactor. The recovery of one train
of the LPIS would have a low performance (as the rest of low pres-
sure equipment analysed in this work), but it would be higher than
the 20% obtained with the pump HH125 due to the higher pressure
head. Considering an efficiency of 20% for one train of the LPIS, this
means 30 kg/s per train. Therefore, the recovery of one train of the
LPIS should also cool down the core. Finally, the recovery of the
Extra Borating System may mitigate the accident without major
damage for a late SBO, but would not avoid RPV failure for an early
one.
The methodology followed to assess the success of core reflood-
ing extends the scope of the computational aids related to this
topic in German Konvoi PWRs (Braun et al., 2014). First of all, the
analyses are extended to injection times beyond CET = 650 C,
whereas the aforementioned study assumes that reflooding always
occurs at CET = 650 C. Furthermore, this study characterizes the
final state of the reactor with several FOMs (e.g. core damage state,
mass of corium in core, etc.) instead of one (success/failure reflood-
ing). The approach is similar to the one used to derive the experi-
mental reflooding map (Hering et al., 2015). However, the
parameters influencing the success/failure of core reflooding are
similar to the ones used in the plant (Braun et al., 2014): the injec-
tion time (instead of the core damage state at reflooding) and the
real mass flow rate injected by each system (instead of the nominal
flow rate). Therefore, the influence of the system pressure is
implicitly considered, which allows the plant crew to anticipate
the potential efficiency of each system.5. Conclusions
Within this work, the severe accident code ASTEC V2.0 has been
used for the improvement of several in-vessel SAM measures (e.g.
primary side depressurization, core reflooding) in a generic Ger-
man Konvoi PWR based on SBLOCA sequences.
First of all, several SBLOCA sequences in the cold leg of the pres-
surizer loop with an additional SBO have been simulated. Results
show that core melting and vessel failure can be considerably
delayed if the SGs are filled before the plant is struck by SBO.
Based on these sequences, an extensive and systematic assess-
ment of primary side depressurization and core reflooding has
been carried out, providing the following main results:
 Primary Side Depressurization should be performed when the
CET > 400 C or, if not possible, with a maximum delay of
20 min since that instant in order to significantly delay core
melting and vessel failure. A 1-h delayed depressurization does
not influence the time to vessel failure, but should be executed
in any case to avoid vessel failure at medium pressures.
 Core reflooding should be launched shortly after the CET
exceeds 650 C with at least 7.50–20 kg/s in order to mitigate
the accident without major core damage. This flow rate mainly
depends on when the plant is struck by SBO. Moreover, calcula-
tions show that vessel integrity cannot be preserved by means
of reflooding if more than 20 corium tons are present in the
lower plenum for more than 20 min.
 Although the possibility of mobile pumps injecting into the RCS
has been temporarily discarded, this work suggests that, in case
of an external injection, the deployment order of medium-high
pressure mobile equipment should be done within 1 h after the
plant is struck by the SBO. The mobile equipment should have a
pressure head above 20 bars and provide the aforementioned
mass flow rate. Moreover, the potential water tanks should have
a capacity of 50–100 water tons. If mobile equipment is not
contemplated, diesel generators should be deployed aiming at
restoring high-pressure core cooling systems.
832 I. Gómez-García-Toraño et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 110 (2017) 818–832It is worth noting that the obtained results are strictly valid
within the validation domain of ASTEC V2.0 (Chatelard et al.,
2014). Therefore, the results concerning degraded core reflooding
should be verified with the ASTEC V2.1 (Chatelard et al., 2016),
which includes a new 2-D treatment of the thermal-hydraulics in
the RPV However, the next step will be focused on the further
improvement of SAM measures based on a total Station Blackout,
which is the sequence with the highest significance for the overall
risk of the German Konvoi PWR.
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